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On the Matter of Good Moral Character 
Paul F. Camenisch 
Prof. Camenisch, a post-doctoral fellow in medical ethics at the 
Institute of Religion, Texas Medical Center in 1975-76, is an associate 
professor of religious studies at DePaul University in Chicago. 
It is becoming ever more difficult to say what it means currently to 
be a professional. On the one hand the once rather specific meaning of 
that label is being diluted by the insistence of various occupational 
groups that they too are "professionals, " by which they seem to mean 
that they are competent, specialized, trained or educated for their 
particular task, "dedicated," and deserving of respect. On the other 
hand the traditional professions -lawyers, doctors, teachers and cler-
ics - and especially the most conspicuous and influential among them, 
lawyers and doctors, are perceived by the public at large - whether 
correctly so or not - as acting in ways which make them increasingly 
indistinguishable from most other economic agents. Together these 
two developments evoke the troubling question, "What, morally 
speaking, does it mean today to be a professional?" 
Some of the differences that label traditionally made, or was 
expected to make are quite clear. One such major difference is re-
flected in Everett Cherrington Hughes' statement that "The profession 
claims and aims to become a moral unit." 1 While such moral claims 
and aspirations often playa minor role in many emerging or aspiring 
professions, they are still important in the image projected by most of 
the traditional professions. They are also important in shaping the 
public's perceptions and expectations of those professions and their 
members. These last two assertions are clearly as applicable to physi-
cians as to any professional group. While there may well be disagree-
ment about the kind of moral unit this central medical profession has 
become or about the kind it should become, there can be little doubt 
that it has claimed to be, has presented itself as a moral unit. By 
"moral unit" I will here mean a group that claims to be motivated by, 
to be dedicated to more than its own gain, that claims to govern its 
conduct and that of its members by considerations other than its own 
self-interest. 
This dimension of being a professional, this atypical commitment 
which Talcott Parsons has called a "collectivity orientation" 2 has, 
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along with professional autonomy or insulation from lay control and 
assessment, and the mastery of special skills and knowledge, been one 
of the major distinguishing characteristics of the professions as tradi-
tionally understood. 
Being a " moral unit" can of course mean several things and can be 
manifested in various ways. As an internal matter it can be seen in the 
medical profession in the oaths administered by many medical schools 
and by some medical fraternities and organizations, in codes of ethics 
such as that of the AMA, and in the supervising and disciplining of its 
members by various organs of the profession. These items, especially 
the latter two, often include matters which are not, strictly speaking, 
moral matters. That is, they also include matters such as professional 
etiquette, image building and protection, and the protection and allo-
cation of professional territory and prerogatives. At the same time, 
however, they also include matters which are significantly moral in the 
fullest sense of that term. 
The above ways of being a moral unit, legitimate and positive 
though they are for the most part, are internal matters of the profes-
sion or the associations and are not legally binding. They do not 
therefore in the most direct and obligatory sense represent commit-
ments made to the society. Of course the autonomy society has tradi-
tionally granted that the medical profession rightly establishes the area 
for and creates an obligation to self-regulation in matters both of 
competence and ethics. Since there is this area of socially established 
and therefore legitimate autonomy granted to the medical profession, 
it is not clear to what extent the larger society or the individual citizen 
can legitimately interfere in or criticize what the profession does there 
in terms of being a moral unit. There the profession is free to choose 
for itself both the ways it will be a moral unit and the content of its 
morality so long as it does not violate the laws governing the conduct 
of all citizens. 
Physician Licensing 
But there is a point at which such societal scrutiny, criticism and, 
when called for, pressure for change, are entirely appropriate. This is 
the point of physician licensing. It is in licensing that the society, not 
the profession, grants admission to the profession. Admittedly the 
present constitution of licensure boards and the manner of choosing 
members for them do not always reflect or sustain this interpretation, 
but legally that is what is there done. 3 It is through licensure therefore 
that the society specifies and enforces the qualifications which will be 
required of those who will be admitted to the profession. Since the 
profession is viewed as a moral unit, such requirements appropriately 
include ethical considerations as well as questions of competence. The 
significance of such ethical considerations is heightened by the fact 
that the medical profession is granted exclusive rights to provide cer-
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tain crucial services to the licensing society and its members. That is, 
because of the nature of the services involved here and because the 
profession is granted exclusive control over them, admission to the 
medical profession is a moral trust.4 The profession and the profes-
sional therefore stand in a fiduciary relationship to the licensing 
society. Thus the candidate who accepts a license under these condi-
tions (that is, one granted on grounds of moral character as well as of 
professional competence), makes a moral commitment which is now 
also legally binding, to conduct himself according to the expectations 
embodied in the licensure procedures and requirements. 
Lc;;t it be thought that this focus on the moral dimensions of licen-
sure is entirely the product of a moralist's myopia or an ethicist's 
illusions of grandeur, it should be noted that the criteria for receiving 
a physician's license in all of the 51 jurisdictions of the United States 
presently include the requirement of "good moral character."5 Simple 
realism requires that the mere existence of such a requirement not be 
taken as proof of its actual significance in the deliberations of the 
boards. Nor can we assume in contemporary America that there is a 
clear and generally accepted meaning for "good moral character." It 
was in the hope of securing answers to these two questions of the 
weight and the content of the "good moral character" required of 
applicants that I undertook a survey of the 51 examining boards in 
November of 1975.6 Of the 51 boards, 19 or 37% responded to the 
questionnaire which was directed to the presiding member of the 
board. 
The questionnaire sought both straightforward factual information 
such as the nature of the laws under which the board functioned, and 
more elusive information such as the board's understanding of "good 
moral character" and related matters. Since I sought a response from a 
single person who could speak for each board rather than trying to 
survey the board's entire membership, information on matters of this 
latter sort is, to some extent, speculative. However, since the 19 
respondents had averaged over five years of service on the boards, they 
had had ample opportunity to become acquainted with the boards' 
general practices and their operating assumptions. 
All 19 respondents acknowledged that their board was charged by 
law with ascertaining and/or certifying the moral character of licen-
sure candidates. But having laid this responsibility upon the boards, 
most states do not tell the boards what they are to understand as 
"good moral character." When asked, "To what extent does the law 
under which the board operates specify what it means by 'good moral 
character'?" 11 respondents answered "not at all," four indicated 
"somewhat," and two said "thoroughly." When asked to what extent 
the rules of state regulatory agencies under which they functioned 
specified the meaning, again two said "thoroughly," four said "some-
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what" and 13 said "not at all." And when asked to what extent the 
board was left on its own to define or specify the meaning of "good 
moral character," 15 responded "entirely," and the remaining four 
"somewhat." Three of these latter four, however, had earlier indicated 
that neither state law nor agency regulations specified such content at 
all. Thus either there was confusion in the respondents' minds about 
the questions or these three boards felt that significant societal guid-
ance is available from sources other than statutory laws and regula-
tions. Furthermore, the two respondents who had indicated that both 
the law and agency regulations "thoroughly" specified the content of 
"good moral character," indicated in this third question that their 
boards were left "entirely" on their own to define it. Whatever the 
significance of these few mixed responses, it is clear that an over-
whelming majority of the boards responding felt they were largely or 
entirely on their own in giving specific content to the "good moral 
character" which the law demanded they require of every candidate. 
Boards' Assessment 
The boards then are asked not only to assess the moral character of 
other persons but to assess it on society's behalf virtually without 
society's guidance and to do so in a more or less public forum and as 
part of a procedure which will have immediate and significant con-
sequences for the one assessed. Many thoughtful persons confronted 
with such a task would experience a profound sense of uneasiness. But 
this appears not to be generally true of those responding to the ques-
tionnaire. Only four agreed strongly and four simply agreed with the 
statement that "In asking the medical examining boards in any way to 
determine and certify the good moral character of licensure candi-
dates, society has given the boards an impossible task since it is no-
where made clear what, if anything, the society means by 'good moral 
character'." Any such uneasiness at this task reflected in agreement 
with this statement was further diminished when the suggestion was 
made that the boards' function in this area should be made more 
precise by stating it in more clearly defined legal terms and simply 
requiring that the board license no one who has a record of felony 
convictions. Here only one agreed strongly, four agreed, nine dis-
agreed, three disagreed strongly and two did not know. The signifi-
cance of such responses is not always obvious. For example, the rejec-
tion of this last suggestion might reflect a reluctance on the part of the 
boards to surrender any of the power they wield over admission to the 
profession. On the other hand it might reflect the commendable con-
viction that the profession of medicine requires more than technically 
competent practitioners who do not break the law. But whatever their 
meaning, these responses indicate rather clearly that whatever uneasi-
ness is felt in assessing the moral character of candidates, most of the 
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boards are not willing to resolve their dilemma by surrendering or even 
curtailing their discretionary powers in this area. 
This reluctance to alter this requirement significantly may well 
derive from the boards' conviction about the importance of good 
moral character in the physician. When asked, "In your estimation to 
what extent do considerations 9f moral character and commit-
ment figure in the board members ' final decision on a candidate?" a 
total of 13 (68%) indicated either " heavily" (7) or "moderately " (6), 
while four indicated "minimally," and two "not at all." 
One indication of the significance of such considerations is the 
number of candidates who have been rejected on such grounds. Eleven 
respondents said they knew of cases in which their board had turned 
down applicants on such grounds. These 11 indicated that in the years 
of board activity known to them, such morally based denials had in 
virtually all states averaged less than one per year and in one case had 
occurred only once in 10 years. 
Without information on the total number of applications processed 
by the boards and, more problematically, without knowing how con-
siderations of moral character figured in deliberations which did not 
end in a denial of license, it is difficult to say how well these denials 
alone indicate the overall significance of moral character in the boards' 
actions. Nevertheless they indicate that the boards do feel sufficiently 
secure in their understanding of good moral character or in their grasp 
of what they take to be society's understanding of it that they are 
willing to base on it judgments of considerable significance to the 
candidate and the society. 
Given that the boards are not willing to surrender their function of 
judging moral character, that they generally feel that moral character 
is not defined for them by the society, and that they do claim to base 
significant judgments on it, it would seem reasonable to assume that 
the boards would themselves have attempted to formulate some work-
ing definition of good moral character in order to keep their judg-
ments consistent over a period of time and in order to keep both 
candidates and the society at large informed concerning the criteria by 
which applicants are assessed. 
While such an assumption would appear to be reasonable it would 
at the same time be false. For even though, as noted above, 15 of the 
19 boards felt that they were entirely on their own in defining good 
moral character and the other four felt somewhat on their own, none 
of those responding indicated that their board had resolved the matter 
through written policy statements to guide their deliberations. Seven 
said they had undertaken to define good moral character "by occa-
sional but not binding discussions of the issue by the board." Eleven 
indicated that any such definition could be found only "implicitly in 
the actions of the board on specific candidates," and five said that 
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their board had confronted the issue " in no specific way." (The num-
ber of responses here exceeds the total of respondents since each was 
asked to mark all the items which applied to his board.) 
No Explicit, Precise Definitions 
Although working without either explicit or precise definitions of 
good moral character, the boards nevertheless do still attempt to 
detect its presence or absence. Letters of recommendation were easily 
the most frequent means employed for this purpose, being used by 18 
of the 19 responding boards. Eight of these indicated that letters were 
"the extent of their board's inquiry into this area." However, when 
other modes of inquiry were suggested, some of them admittedly 
quite indirect, at least four of these eight indicated other means were 
also employed. Eleven of the boards indicated that they relied in part 
on "the candidate's response to questions in the interview aimed at 
revealing his moral character, values and commitments." Nine indi-
cated that their board also considered "the candidate's written 
response to questions concerning his values and commitments" and/or 
the "implicit revelation of the candidate's character, etc., in his gen-
eral conduct in the interview." Another six of the boards cited "board 
members' intuitions concerning the candidate's character." 
The overall picture which emerges here would seem to represent an 
altogether too casual approach to a matter which the boards profess to 
take with great seriousness, a function which they do not want to 
surrender, a requirement the society has thought important enough to 
write into law and a judgment on which the professional careers of 
some and the health and well-being of many may depend. This is not 
to argue that the boards should mount a moral inquisition on some 
specific and exclusive understanding of good moral character. It is to 
suggest, however, that such behavior may well be a significant disser-
vice to the public and to the candidates for licensure for it prevents 
both from being as fully informed about the operations of the boards 
as they have a right to be. The candidates obviously have a significant 
stake in the outcome of the boards' deliberations and so have a right 
to know as precisely as possible on what grounds they will be assessed. 
The society on whose behalf the boards function has a right to know 
against what ills this requirement of good moral character is supposed 
to protect them, and this requires that they know something of what 
that phrase means to the boards which enforce the requirement. Such 
casual acceptance and subsequent indifferent handling of such moral 
categories also contribute to the general devaluation of moral /ethical 
language and concepts which plague contemporary society. Having 
consented to operate under such requirements, the boards have an 
obligation to take them seriously or to work for their alteration. At 
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the same time it must be admitted that any failure here is shared by 
the society and/or its legislators for requiring the boards to assess 
moral character without saying what they mean by it. 
Even in the absence of stated definitions it can be assumed that 
since the boards do make judgments about good moral character they 
must have some conception of what they are looking for. The 
respondents were therefore provided with a list of eight items and 
were asked: "On your interpretation of the boards' actions, the fol-
lowing elements are major, moderately significant, minor, or negligible 
factors in the boards' understanding of "good moral character." The 
relative importance of each item was to be indicated by the number 
assigned to it. Even if the responses received are taken not to represent 
the boards themselves but only the personal stance of the specific 
respondents, they are still of considerable interest since in most cases 
they come from experienced observers and/or participants of the 
boards. 
Taking into account the weighted voting for the items, the results 
were as follows. Ranked almost equally as most important were two 
items: "readiness to abide by laws governing medical practice (e.g., 
abortion and drug laws)" and "willingness to abide by moral demands 
of doctor-patient relationship (e.g., to observe confidentiality)." Next 
came a group of three items ranked very close to each other: "ranking 
patient's well-being as his highest goal in his practice of medicine;" 
"willingness to abide by professional 'etiquette' (e.g., not to adver-
tise);" and "dedication to delivering the highest quality of medical 
care he and the science are capable of." The last group of three, 
significantly below the previous group, were, in order of descending 
importance: "dedication to enhancing public health through preventa-
tive as well as curative measures;" "dedication to seeing that all need-
ing medical care get it under conditions they can meet without hard-
ship;" "preference for the traditional fee-for-service mode of prac-
tice." 7 
Aspects of Interest 
There are several aspects of this ranking which are of considerable 
interest even if, as some might suggest, the ranking itself is fairly 
predictable. Given the current critical mood of the public, some might 
suspect that the top ranking given to the readiness to abide by relevant 
laws represents the profession's retreat to the lowest tolerable mini-
mum in matters of moral character. But it might simply reflect the 
fact that the law is the most explicit, the most clearly specified and 
most concrete set of standards available. It might also reflect the 
boards ' awareness that here as nowhere else the society, or at least 
those legislating on its behalf have given specific content to their 
expectations in this area. At the same time it might simply be one 
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manifestation of a wider phenomenon - that when moral guidelines 
and definitions in a society are in flux or are losing both their clarity 
and their influence, most persons will tum to legal guidelines to 
replace them. 
In fact many of the boards may well rely on the law to settle the 
question of good moral character to a much greater extent than these 
responses alone would indicate. The practice of some boards, appar-
ently as a matter of policy, is to minimize the matter of good moral 
character in the licensing of candidates but with the understanding 
that the candidates ' subsequent conduct, most notably the violation 
of certain laws relevant either directly or indirectly to medical practice 
and its demands, will serve as prima facie evidence for an absence of 
good moral character. The assumption is that such conduct will be 
taken as grounds for considering whether the board should exercise 
one of its other powers, that of revoking the physician's license. 8 
Given the present state of the public's understanding of good moral 
character, this may be a commendably responsible way of handling 
the matter. However, the profession should take note of at least one 
significant implication of such reliance on strictly legal canons for 
defining the good moral character to be required of physicians. To 
the extent that the moral dimensions of professional life are defined 
only by laws, most of which at the same time regulate the conduct of 
non-professionals, the claim of the profession to be a "moral unit" in 
some distinctive sense which sets it off from the rest of the society is 
proportionately undercut. There are, after all, few non-criminal forms 
of employment in our society in which the violation of certain laws 
would not jeopardize the violator's employment. 
The high position accorded the moral demands of the doctor-
patient relation might, like the high ranking of obedience to the law, 
reflect the desire for specific content which in this case is furnished 
not by statute law but by long and, to a considerable extent, fairly 
specific tradition. 
Two of the middle group of three - those concerning the patient's 
well-being and the quality of care delivered - are, like the second item 
above, elements of special importance in the doctor-patient relation. 
They are commitments or obligations which guide conduct between 
two individuals. The third item in this middle group is the only one in 
the list referring directly to matters which most non-physicians would 
see as a matter of professional etiquette or even of professional self-
defense, rather than of morality proper. The interesting fact about its 
location is not that it was ranked conspicuously high, for it was not, 
but that it was ranked above all three items which referred to ques-
tions of the distribution of health care, of the profession's larger 
moral responsibilities to the total society. 
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Putting Elements in Order 
The grouping of the eight elements in the order of importance 
makes it clear that "good moral character" in the minds of the 
respondents emphatically has more to do with the professional's obli-
gations to a limited number of specific individuals, to his patients, 
than to the society at large, to the entire population of those needing 
health care. In this second area which includes such matters as the 
distribution of health care and the mode and ease of patient access to 
it, it is not as important that preference for the fee -for-service mode of 
practice and distribution was placed last as it is that all three items 
concerning the profession's relation or obligations to the larger society 
were given lowest billing. The stand taken on these matters is not as 
important in the present context as is the fact that these matters 
themselves were placed last as elements in defining the good moral 
character relevant to being a physician. 
This low ranking of societal issues and responsibilities is of special 
interest in light of the fact that these same respondents, when asked to 
indicate the major differences between professional and other occupa-
tional licensing, gave highest place to "the degree of dedication to the 
public well-being expected of the licensee." ("The amount and type 
of preparation required" was a close second.) Similarly the respond-
ents indicated that the license is more important as an expression of 
the physician's relation to the society at large, than to his professional 
colleagues (placed last), or to an accumulated body of knowledge and 
technique, or even to his patients (placed second). In spite of these 
responses, however, the respondents portrayed their boards as under-
standing the acceptance of a license by a physician more as the legal 
prerequisite for practicing medicine than as the acceptance of a moral 
trust from the society to serve the pUblic. This is admittedly an 
unclear picture and it may well be that the boards' definition of the 
good moral character required of a candidate need not coincide with 
or even reflect the boards' understanding of the significance of licen-
sure itself. On the other hand there are obvious reasons for keeping 
these two matters related to each other, for rightly understood they 
are both important elements in any understanding of the moral mean-
ing of "professional," in any view of a profession as a "moral unit." 
At the same time it should be noted that the tendency noted above 
in the ranking of the elements of good moral character to see ques-
tions of morality and ethics largely if not exclusively in terms of issues 
of individual or personal relations at the expense of larger societal 
issues is not unique to the medical profession. It is a pervasive Amer-
ican tendency. Nevertheless it will be unfortunate if the medical pro-
fession in this time of growing societal uncertainty about and unhappi-
ness with health care does not begin to realize that among its profes-
sional obligations are obligations to the society as a whole and thus to 
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see that the ability to recognize and the willingness to respond to 
these should playa larger role in what is meant by good moral char-
acter. As Edmund D. Pellegrino, M.D., has suggested, it may well be 
precisely this failure of the profession to enlarge its understanding of 
its obligations toward the larger society that accounts for the declining 
prestige of the profession as a whole even while individual physicians 
retain the respect of their own patients. 9 
While it is a good thing, as Hughes puts it, for a profession to claim 
and aim to become a moral unit, it must also come to realize that at 
the same time it is a part of a larger moral reality, the society which 
created it, which sustains it and which now depends on it for essential 
services. In other words, if being a "moral unit" has been something 
which the professions have seen as distinguishing them from the rest 
of the society, currently they are being challenged to understand that 
same fact of being a moral unit as also tying them extensively and 
intimately to the larger society, to see that to be a moral unit means 
not to be an isolated self-defined monad, but rather to be one inter-
related, interdependent part of a larger moral reality, the total society. 
Obviously the matter of good moral character on which this discus-
sion has focused is not the only, perhaps not even the most important 
element in a profession's being a moral unit. The most that need be 
claimed here is that it is one such important element and may there-
fore serve as a starting point for investigating what, morally speaking, 
it means in these days to be a professional, whether medical or other-
wise. 
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